Statement to the Planning and Economic Development Committee, North Jersey
Transportation Planning Authority, Inc.
The New Jersey Association of Railroad Passengers (NJ-ARP) urges the North
Jersey Transportation Planning Authority, Inc. (NJTPA) to reject the Locally
Preferred Alternative (LPA) of the ARC Trans-Hudson Express Tunnel Project
proposed by NJ Transit (NJT).
NJ-ARP has been a persistent advocate recommending additional trans-Hudson
River rail transit capacity to meet growing demand. No new rail trackage
has been added across the Hudson River since the existing Penn Station rail
tunnels were completed in 1910. But west of Hudson population has tripled;
highway tunnel and bridge crossings are congested and operating at capacity,
and no new highway lanes can be added given cost and environmental
considerations. Relief is certainly called for.
Recall that the driving force behind the initiation of the Access to the
Region's Core (ARC) project was to permit New Jersey residents to access
rapidly expanding job site locations in East midtown Manhattan in close proximity
to Grand Central Terminal (GCT). Data collected by the Port Authority revealed
that about 70% of midtown office space is within a ten-minute walk of that
landmark station.
In that context, NJ-ARP believes that the current NJT Locally Preferred
Alternative (LPA) is seriously flawed and should be rejected by NJTPA.
NJ-ARP strongly supports the plan's provision for two additional tracks under
the Hudson River to New York's Penn Station (NYP), but disagrees with other
elements of the plan, especially the proposed deep level station beneath
34th Street in Manhattan.
Not only is this plan costly and inconvenient for rail passengers, but
constructing a subterranean annex station contiguous to Macy's -- some 125
feet below 34th Street in Manhattan -- will also pose significant risks to
passengers in this age of concerns about security. In our opinion, it would
be appropriate to sever the deep-level 34th Street Station from this project
and terminate the tunnel in a fashion that would permit its future extension
once transit planning agencies develop a regional solution for metropolitan
area mobility in concert with one another. Further, evaluation of other plans
to substantially increase Penn Station capacity in the short-run, such as
through running between the MTA's New Haven line and NJT's Northeast Corridor,
have not been addressed.
We would urge all parties and stakeholders to review the original tenets
of the ARC project and re-examine other methods and solutions to provide
a direct rail link between Penn Station and Grand Central Terminal. This
has become even more critical and appropriate given the recent rise in the
cost of motor fuels.
During the Major Investment Study (MIS) phase of the Access to the Region's
Core (ARC) project, three final options were selected for detailed examination.
All three options included identical infrastructure in New Jersey and a pair
of new tunnels under the Hudson River. Alternative "P" called for a deep
cavern station under the existing Penn Station, a plan similar to NJT's current
recommended "preferred" plan. In Alternative "S", the new tunnels would tie
into existing tracks in the southern portion of Penn Station, and then continue
east in new tunnels under 31st Street and under the East River to an expanded
storage yard at Sunnyside Yard. The third option, Alternative "G", was similar
to Alternative "S" as far east as Park Avenue in Manhattan, but then would
turn north and tie into existing tracks in the Lower Level of Grand Central
Terminal. This option is strongly supported by NJ-ARP and transit advocates
because it would bring passengers to the East Midtown area, where a large
number of NJT rail passengers are headed.
Attached Exhibits 2 and 3, derived from data contained in the ARC MIS 2003
Summary Report, compare key evaluation measures of each of these options.
In each case Alternative "G" outperforms the other options, and we believe,
should be the clear choice. It produces the highest number of peak hour
passengers and diverts the greatest number of auto trips from crowded
trans-Hudson highways. It is the only option that saves travel time for
passengers headed to the East Midtown area. Surprisingly, this superior
performance is achieved with the lowest operating and capital cost, and with
the highest projected passenger revenue.
Yet in the Scoping Report for the Draft Environmental Impact Study (DEIS),
Alternative "G" has been rejected. To NJ-ARP, this is a mistake. Exhibit
1 lists the four reasons NJT cites for rejecting this alternative. Each reason
is contradicted by a response based on NJT's own discussion of alternatives
and the resulting findings presented in the 2003 Summary Report.
Transit advocates have concluded that New Jersey Transit selected an alternative
that does not require the full active cooperation of New York State's
Metropolitan Transportation Authority. Going it alone results in a costly,
but inferior plan. With new political leadership expected in both states,
planners at NJT and MTA should be working toward common, cost-effective solutions
that are in the travelers' best interests. In the meantime, NJT could move
forward on those elements of its transit plan that still permit the ultimate
completion of Alternative "G". These would include the new tunnels tying
into existing tracks at Penn Station and significant access improvements
to existing platforms at the station. Also, to relieve overcrowding in the
near term, NJT should seek common ground with MTA to advance through running
at Penn Station -- a facility ideally suited for this mode of operation.
Through running has the potential for increasing existing tunnel capacity
by 25 to 50%.
Several refinements in the West of Hudson elements of the preferred alternative
are also needed. In particular, options to the loop plan at Secaucus should
be explored. A direct connection would save travel time, and should be less
costly. This is especially important to transit riders from Bergen and Passaic
Counties. Furthermore, planning for additional capacity across the Hackensack
River and west to Newark must be fully integrated and not segmented in this
DEIS process. Without this capacity, the new tunnel will fail to reach its
full potential.
NJTPA, together with the New York Metropolitan Transportation Council (NYMTC),
its equivalent planning agency east of the Hudson, can advance regional transit
options and solutions that meet the needs of the riding public and rise above
narrow transit agency prerogatives.
NJ-ARP urges NJTPA to reject NJT's "Locally Preferred Alternative" and
instead to require formulation of a plan that takes the first steps leading
to the real winner and key objective of the ARC project: the Penn Station
New York - Grand Central Terminal connection.
NJT Mistaken in Eliminating Alternative G for Consideration as Locally Preferred
Alternative
After nearly ten years of planning, the Access to the Region's Core (ARC)
project identified three final alternatives, G, P and S, for detailed evaluation.
The results of this analysis are summarized in the ARC Major Investment Study
(MIS) 2003 Summary Report. The evidence developed in the analysis overwhelmingly
shows that Alternative G, with its connection from Penn Station New York
(PSNY) to Grand Central Terminal (GCT), provides the most benefit to trans-Hudson
travelers at the lowest cost of the three alternatives considered (see Exhibits
2 & 3).
Yet in the May 2004 Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) Scoping Document,
Alternative G was eliminated from the DEIS process and given no consideration
to become the Locally Preferred Alternative (LPA) for four key reasons. Regional
transit advocates take strong exception to this decision, given that each
concern was addressed in the MIS report. Exhibit 1 below lists each reason
and cites specific findings in the MIS report that contradict these reasons.
Exhibit 1
| Responses To Reasons For Eliminating Alternative G |
| Reason for Eliminating Alternative G* |
Response Based on MIS Findings** |
| 1. Lowest additional trans-Hudson AM peak hour train service. |
Capacity of 34 eastbound NJT trains in the AM peak hour is adequate to
handle 2020-projected demand, with 20 trains through PSNY to GCT and 14 to
PSNY. If needed, additional PSNY trains could be accommodated in the existing
Hudson River tunnels. |
| 2. Constructability impact of the physical breakout at the southern end
of GCT. |
GCT was designed to be expandable south under Park Ave - it is physically
feasible to break out of the lower level of GCT Tracks 105-112. Level of
impact on subways, buildings & support facilities and mitigation not
identified. |
| 3. Disruption created by relocation of southbound Lex. Ave. subway local
track, with construction affecting a short stretch of subway platform. |
Required relocation is feasible. Construction would cause temporary service
impacts to the Lexington Ave. Line. Level of impact and mitigation not
identified. |
| 4. Impacts, delays and risks associated with property acquisition and
easements required to construct the tunnel segment between Penn Station New
York and GCT. |
Penn Station was designed to be expandable east under 31st St. - easement
and space exist under 11 Penn Plaza for connection to 31st St. tunnels. No
property acquisition concerns identified in report. (Easements for proposed
Trans-Hudson Express station under 34th St. and Macy's and connecting tunnels
would be much more extensive.) |
* Source: ARC DEIS Final Scoping Document, May 2004 cover
date.
** Source: ARC MIS 2003 Summary Report, Web creation date 11/06/03. |
Alternative G will attract the most trans-Hudson riders and divert the
most travelers from autos and all other modes to rail. Alternative G
is the only alternative that will bring passengers into GCT (more than 1/3
are projected to prefer GCT); an estimated 23,000+ hours will be saved by
these travelers each weekday, more than 3,000 work years annually.
Exhibit 2
| Transportation Impacts (2020) Comparison* - Alternatives G,
P & S |
| |
No Build |
Alternative G (to GCT) |
Alternative P (to Penn Sta.) |
Alternative S (to Sunnyside) |
Best Alternative |
| 2020 Trans-Hudson Passengers - AM Peak Hour |
28,539 |
37,759 |
36,944 |
35,353 |
G |
| GCT Trans-Hudson Passengers - AM Peak Hour |
0 |
13,415 |
0 |
0 |
G |
| Auto Diversions to Rail - Avg. Weekday Travelers |
Base |
9,402 |
5,614 |
4,192 |
G |
| All Modes Diversions to Rail - Avg. Weekday Travelers |
Base |
36,204 |
24,321 |
18,927 |
G |
| Time Savings for GCT Trans-Hudson Passengers - Hours per Avg. Weekday** |
0 |
23,678 |
0 |
0 |
G |
* Source: ARC MIS 2003 Summary Report, Web creation date 11/06/03.
Alt. P with tail tracks used in all comparisons.
** Travel time savings = ARC MIS 2003 Summary Report Alt. G AM peak hour
trans-Hudson passengers to GCT (13,415) x NYMTC CBD 2001 Hub Bound Travel
Report ratio of 2-way 24-hour to AM peak hour trans-Hudson rail passengers
(139,038/19,693 = 7.06) x 15 minutes (.25 hours) saved per passenger = 23,678
Hours/Avg. Weekday. |
Alternative G is estimated to cost the least to construct; to produce
the most passenger revenue; and to be the least costly to operate and
maintain. Incremental operating revenue for Alternative G would equal
or exceed incremental costs, reducing NJ Transit's operating deficit. In
contrast, other alternatives would require increased annual operating subsidies
of $24-$74 million.
Exhibit 3
| Financial Impacts (in 2000 $) Comparison* - Alternatives G,
P & S |
| |
No Build |
Alternative G (to GCT) |
Alternative P (to Penn Sta.) |
Alternative S (to Sunnyside) |
Best Alternative |
| Construction Cost |
Base |
$2.9-$3.1 B |
$3.3-$3.6 B |
$3.2-$3.4 B |
G |
| Annual Incremental Operating & Maintenance Cost |
Base |
$43-$54 M |
$94-$115 M |
$57-$71 M |
G |
| Annual Incremental Passenger Revenue |
Base |
$54 M |
$41 M |
$33 M |
G |
| * Source: ARC MIS 2003 Summary Report, Web creation date 11/06/03.
Alt. P with tail tracks used in all comparisons. |
Copyright ©2005 NJ-ARP
These files were created by Bob Scheurle.
|
