Response to New Jersey Transit's Letter of May 19, 2006, addressed to Mrs.
Rose Heck
To: The Honorable Kris Kolluri, Commissioner of Transportation of the State
of New Jersey and Chairman of New Jersey Transit, Inc.; Members of the Board
of Directors of New Jersey Transit, Inc.
As speakers before me have discussed, former State Assemblywoman Rose Heck,
my colleagues Jack May and Frank Miklos, and I met on May 5, 2006 with
Commissioner Kolluri, Assistant Executive Director Richard Sarles, and other
members of the staff of New Jersey Transit to discuss our view -- as
spokespersons for the New Jersey Association of Railroad Passengers, as well
as citizens, residents and taxpayers -- that New Jersey Transit's current
proposal to implement a commuter railroad shuttle, operated by Diesel Multiple
Unit (DMU) railcars, between North Bergen in Hudson County and Tenafly in
Bergen County is ill-advised. We urged then, urge now and will continue to
urge in the future that New Jersey Transit revert to its previous plan --
clearly the Locally Preferred Alternative -- to extend the Hudson Bergen
Light Rail system initially to Tenafly and north thereof. Both alternatives
-- a DMU Shuttle and an HBLR extension -- involve following the Northern
Branch of the former Erie Railroad, now operated by CSX Transportation.
While our discussions were amicable, was clear that there was no meeting
of the minds. Subsequently, on May 19, 2006, Executive Director George D.
Warrington, who was not with us on May 5th, wrote to Mrs. Heck defending
the agency's choice of the DMU plan and providing justification for abandoning
its commitment to extend its New Jersey Waterfront light rail system into
Eastern Bergen County as Phase 3 of the Hudson Bergen Light Rail Project.
The primary thrust of Mr. Warrington's letter is that the DMU Shuttle Plan
is but Phase 1 of a longer-ranged concept and that eventually "...dual
mode equipment that can switch from diesel to electric propulsion will make
it possible for Northern Branch service to directly access THE Tunnel."
I am here to advise you that Mr. Warrington's letter and its rationale are
unconvincing but before doing so I would like to remind the Board of Directors
of New Jersey Transit of the following:
• The Final Scoping Document of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS)
for the Access to the Region's Core (ARC) Project, dated May 2004, makes
no mention whatsoever of including the Northern Branch in the ARC Project
or routing any service from it through the proposed Trans Hudson Express
THE) Tunnel. To the contrary, this document states that New Jersey Transit
is studying "...extension of the Hudson-Bergen Light Rail on the CSX line
between Tenafly and Hoboken (Northern Branch); and initiation of commuter
rail service on the NYS&W corridor between Passaic County and North Bergen
to Passaic (Bergen-Passaic Light Rail). DEIS documents will be prepared for
each of these proposed lines."
• The idea of scuttling the light rail extension to Tenafly, although perhaps
in the works, did not surface publicly until June 8, 2005. On that date,
with no public input to our knowledge, New Jersey Transit's Board of Directors,
then chaired by Commissioner Jack Lattiere, passed a resolution that announcing
that it had substituted a commuter railroad shuttle service for the previously
planned extension of the Hudson Bergen Light Rail system to Tenafly. Part
of NJT's press release stated:
In the first phase, DMU railcars would connect Northern Branch riders with
Hudson-Bergen Light Rail service in North Bergen for access to the Hudson
River waterfront, as well as connections to PATH trains and trans-Hudson
ferries. The second phase of the plan calls for the Northern Branch to be
linked to the Tran-Hudson Tunnel deep within the Palisades, allowing for
direct commuter service between Tenafly and Midtown Manhattan.
We dispute that the latter -- one-seat service from the Northern Branch via
the THE Tunnel -- is affordable, operationally feasible or even likely to
happen. In the vernacular, we believe that New Jersey Transit is attempting
to sell the people of Bergen County and their elected officials "a bill of
goods."
Turning to Mr. Warrington's letter to Mrs. Heck and its attachments, I am
reminded of a Yiddish proverb that you may be familiar with: "A half truth
has the intent of a whole lie."
Mr. Warrington's letter retains the fiction, again to quote the June 8, 2005,
press release, that "The [DMU Shuttle] plan would provide passenger rail
service to residents along the line from Tenafly to North Bergen within a
shorter timeframe and at a lower cost, while eventually delivering the ultimate
commuting benefit: a one-seat ride into Midtown Manhattan."
These are but a few of the inconsistencies that we seen in New Jersey Transit's
response:
• The projected capacity of the Trans Hudson Express Tunnel is 23-24 trains
per hour. The DEIS Scoping Document for the ARC Project, as well as other
information released by New Jersey Transit, indicates that the THE Tunnel
will be access to Midtown Manhattan for trains from and to the Bergen County,
Main Line, Pascack Valley and Raritan Valley lines, as well as additional
Midtown Direct service from the Morris and Essex Line and the Montclair/Boonton
Line. Add to these requirements, a similar number of trains (including those
of Amtrak) routed through the North River Tunnels to Pennsylvania Station
from the Northeast Corridor and North Jersey Coast lines, as well as the
potential from the Monmouth-Ocean-Middlesex Project. With this number of
train movements in peak period, both sets of tunnels will be at capacity.
It is our understanding that the conceptual operations plan for the THE Tunnel
envisions only 10 or 11 "slots" being allocated to Bergen/Main Line/Pascack
Valley trains and the remainder -- 12 or 13 "slots" being allocated to expanded
Midtown Direct service from and to the Morris and Essex Line and the
Montclair/Boonton Line. Surely the Metropolitan Transportation Authority
also will demand "slots" to and from Midtown Manhattan for its Southern Tier
(Port Jervis) trains as part of its price for supporting the ARC Project.
Nevertheless, after holding out the prospect of one-seat service from and
to the Northern Branch, Mr. Warrington's letter says "We can also see how
DMU technology makes future connections to the Main, Bergen and Pascack Valley
Lines via the NYS&W Lines via the NYS&W freight line achievable."
We must ask "Where will be additional capacity in the THE Tunnel for four
trains per hour in peak periods come from? Certainly this number is needed
to achieve a projected ridership of 34,000 passengers per day. And then to
add additional peak period Midtown Direct trains routed by way of the Susquehanna
to the THE Tunnel?
To achieve a throughput of more than 48 trains per hour per direction through
the Hudson River Tunnels would require the Trans Hudson Express Tunnel to
be built with four tracks -- not two as planned. Rest assured that it would
raise the cost of the THE Tunnel from $6 billion to $10 billion (both in
2005 dollars). And this is before $900 million above the base $6 billion
project estimate, which the staff admitted at a recent Board of Directors
Meeting to be the "rough cost" of a Northern Branch connection to the THE
Tunnel. As noted above, is quoted in 2005 dollars. When the effects of inflation,
even at three percent (3%) per year compounded to a 2014-15 midpoint of
construction, are taken into account the finished cost of THE Tunnel is likely
to in the range of $8 billion if not more.
• Mr. Warrington, undaunted by this reality, advised Mrs. Heck "Be assured
that the Northern Branch/THE Tunnel Connection is not a project that must
wait until THE Tunnel is completed. It can be advanced in phases concurrently
with the larger project. We will initiate the environmental process and
engineering for the Connection (which will cost roughly $900 million while
we are constructing THE Tunnel itself. As we near completion of THE Tunnel,
we can start construction on the Connection so we can be open by the end
of the next decade." In other words by 2019 -- thirteen years from now at
best.
In reality, the Northern Branch Connection, if built, would add another $1.2
to 1.5 billion, depending upon when its construction began. As Mr. May observed
at during our May 5th meeting, when -- as they inevitably will -- the actual
costs of the ARC Project escalate beyond those current anticipated, the Northern
Branch Connection would be the first to be cut out, even if this is
euphemistically described as "deferring" it until later. What this will do
-- and we are certain that it will happen -- is leave Eastern Bergen County
stuck with a "Tenafly Dinky" and its inconvenient and time-consuming transfer
to the Hudson Bergen Light Rail system for decades to come, if not for another
century.
One also has to ask would $900 million (in 2005 dollars) spent on the Connection
be value for money even if room in the THE Tunnels for a few Northern Branch
trains could be found? Even at an inflated cost of $3 million per track mile
(or $6 million per double-track mile) this sum would pay for electrifying
up to 150 route miles of New Jersey Transit's commuter railroad system. That
would be sufficient to electrify the Bergen and Main Lines to Suffern; the
Pascack Valley Line to Spring Valley; the Boonton Line from Montclair State
University/Little Falls to Denville; the Raritan Valley Line; and the North
Jersey Coast Line from Mattawan to Bay Head Junction.
Given both the rising cost of petroleum and the likelihood of its increase
scarcity, we would think that New Jersey Transit's staff would rethink their
priorities and seek to apply the scare funds available to the agency where
they will do the most good. This, however, will require them to drop their
oft-heard refrains to the effect that "Electrification is too expensive"
and that "It's a waste of money." In fact, electrification -- including on
the Northern Branch -- is the agency's best hope for managing its operating
budget and attracting ridership in the future.
Others have spoken to you about the "heavy thumb on the scale" where New
Jersey Transit's estimate of $945.8 million as the projected cost of extending
the Hudson Bergen Light Rail system to Tenafly compared with its $475.0 million
estimate for its preferred DMU Shuttle Plan. We recommend to the Board of
Directors of New Jersey Transit that they order a value engineering study
of the two alternatives for the Northern Branch -- both LRT and DMU -- with
the objectives of eliminating over-design and putting them on an equal footing
that will allow unbiased evaluation before any further commitment is made
to the DMU Shuttle Plan for the Northern Branch.
There are many other points made in Mr. Warrington's letter to Mrs. Heck
that we take issue with and which we have or will rebut, both in this forum
and others, as well as in writing. In summary, taken as a whole, I cannot
give any more credibility to this letter than I did to Mr. Warrington's sworn
testimony before Congress, when he was President of the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation, that "Amtrak is on a glide path to profitability."
Circling the wagons and holding onto the DMU Shuttle Plan for the Northern
Branch at all costs puts Eastern Bergen County on a "glide path to disaster."
Truly, what New Jersey Transit is proposing is the "Great Light Rail Robbery."
We do not intend to let you get away with it.
Thank you,
Philip G. Craig
Copyright ©2006 NJ-ARP
These files were created by Bob Scheurle.
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